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BRIDGING THE GAP: ASSESSING THE STATE OF
FEDERAL CORRUPTION LAW AFTER KELLY V.
UNITED STATES
Michael J. Morgan*
Political corruption in the United States has become more and more
prevalent in recent years. These days it seems difficult to turn on the news
without hearing accusations of a public official caught in a scandal. Despite
the frequency of the corrupt acts, however, the federal government remains
largely unable to hold state actors accountable.
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently overturned federal convictions
of state officials charged with committing corrupt acts. The issue in these
cases is not the lack of corruption or proof of the acts but rather, the lack of
laws that adequately criminalize the corrupt conduct. As a result, the same
corrupt actions being publicly denounced in the news are being excused in
the justice system.
This Note examines the Court’s recent corruption cases and analyzes the
rationales behind them. This Note then applies this analysis to Kelly v.
United States, the most recent case in the federal corruption saga, to evaluate
where the Court stands on federal corruption.
Ultimately, this Note concludes that, in Kelly, the Court is sending a clear
message to Congress: amend the corruption laws to properly cover the
conduct. It then proposes an amended version of the current law that takes
into account the analysis of Kelly and other federal corruption cases.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 9, 2013, high-ranking New Jersey officials ordered workers
for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (“Port Authority”) to
shut down two lanes of the George Washington Bridge.1 The three rush-hour
lanes, which for decades had eased the flow of traffic out of Fort Lee, New
Jersey, were abruptly reduced to a single lane.2 Officials from the Port
Authority cautioned against this, but the state responded that it was
conducting a traffic study and that the Port Authority should not warn Fort
Lee officials or police officers.3
The abrupt closure of the world’s busiest bridge caused a public safety
disaster. Motorists trying to enter Manhattan gridlocked Fort Lee.4 On a
week that included the first day of school, Yom Kippur, and the anniversary
of the September 11 terrorist attacks, car-clogged streets brought Fort Lee to
a standstill.5 Traffic blocked emergency vehicles from responding to a heart
1. Kate Zernike, The Bridge Scandal, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/04/nyregion/george-washington-bridge-scandal-whatyou-need-to-know.html [https://perma.cc/4MQH-SMFY].
2. See Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1568 (2020).
3. See Zernike, supra note 1.
4. Adam Liptak & Nick Corasaniti, Supreme Court Unanimously Overturns
‘Bridgegate’ Convictions, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05
/07/us/supreme-court-bridgegate.html [https://perma.cc/X7AU-F3C3].
5. See Zernike, supra note 1.
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attack victim6 and left school buses parked in the streets for hours.7 Halfhour commutes turned into four-hour nightmares.8
As Fort Lee mayor Mark Sokolich scrambled to contain the chaos erupting
in his city, he contacted Port Authority deputy executive director Bill Baroni
and pleaded for help.9 One of his countless unanswered voicemails asked a
simple, but glaring question: “Who’s mad at me?”10
The answer was Bridget Anne Kelly, deputy chief of staff to then New
Jersey governor Chris Christie.11 What they portrayed as a “traffic study”
was truly the result of a multilevel abuse of power aimed at punishing Fort
Lee’s Democratic mayor in what would soon become known as
“Bridgegate.”12
Upset that Sokolich had refused to endorse Chris Christie’s reelection
campaign, Kelly had reached out to Baroni to retaliate.13 They planned to
purposely close the Fort Lee rush-hour lanes to “‘creat[e] a traffic jam that
would punish’ Mayor Sokolich and ‘send him a message.’”14 The resulting
traffic catastrophe lasted for four days, only coming to an end when the Port
Authority executive director discovered Kelly and Baroni’s “abusive
decision” and reversed it.15
Federal prosecutors charged Baroni and Kelly with wire fraud under 18
U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 666(a)(1)(A).16 The jury found both of them guilty on
all counts.17 The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting Baroni and Kelly’s claim
that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions.18 At a
minimum, the circuit court held, Kelly and Baroni violated the wire fraud
statute by depriving the Port Authority of the value of public employee
labor.19 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. In May 2020, the Court
reversed the Third Circuit’s decision in Kelly v. United States.20 The Court
held that a bridge closing scheme aimed at punishing a political adversary
did not violate federal corruption laws.21

6. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1570.
7. See Zernike, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Kate Zernike & Noah Remnick, Fort Lee Officials Recall Chaos and Turmoil as
Lanes to Bridge Were Closed, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com
/2016/09/21/nyregion/fort-lee-police-chief-recalls-chaos-and-turmoil-as-bridge-lanes-wereclosed.html [https://perma.cc/BZ3G-B2UZ].
11. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1570.
12. See id. at 1569.
13. See id.
14. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Joint Appendix (Volume I of II) at 254, Kelly, 140
S. Ct. 1565 (No. 18-1059)).
15. Id. at 1570.
16. Id. at 1568, 1571.
17. Id.
18. See United States v. Baroni, 909 F.3d 550, 562 (3d Cir. 2018), rev’d and remanded
sub nom. Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565.
19. See id.
20. 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020).
21. See id. at 1569.
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Kelly is only the latest case exemplifying the Supreme Court’s
commitment to narrowly interpreting federal laws targeting corruption.22 It
is a familiar script: political actors do something widely recognized as
corrupt and wrongful.23 They are prosecuted for their corruption and
convicted for using their offices and powers for their personal benefit. In
doing so, they directly harm the very public they represent. Yet, under
current federal laws, their acts are not criminal because those laws were not
written to capture the misconduct.
The Court’s consistent unwillingness to uphold federal corruption
convictions could be the Court accepting this as the new normal—that even
corrupt politicians cannot be regulated by federal laws.24 If so, there is
concern that the Court is entrenching corruption and bribery in the political
system.25 However, the Court may actually be alerting lawmakers to
shortcomings in federal corruption statutes. Kelly appears to be an attempt
to do this.
This Note seeks to clarify how the federal government should approach
corruption laws. Part I investigates landmark federal corruption cases and
how the Court has interpreted Congress’s ambiguous legislative efforts to
fight corruption. Part II discusses the different concepts and rationales
behind the Court’s decisions. Part III then applies the rationales to Kelly and
recommends that Congress amend the honest services statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1346, to define “honest services” with reference to state law.
I. FOUNDATIONAL BEARINGS: BACKGROUND AND LEGAL CONTEXT
This part discusses the necessary background information concerning
corruption legislation in the United States. Part I.A provides a brief
description of the meaning of corruption. Part I.B summarizes the history of
federal corruption law and the landmark cases that define it. Part I.C then
discusses Congress’s previous efforts to solve the federal corruption issue.
Finally, Part I.D briefly summarizes how states have criminalized corruption.

22. See infra Part I.B (discussing the cases fundamental to the Court’s narrow ruling in
Kelly).
23. See, e.g., McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016); United States v.
Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2015).
24. See Leah Litman, The Supreme Court Says Sorry, It Just Can’t Help with Political
Corruption, ATLANTIC (May 8, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05
/supreme-court-embracing-deep-cynicism-about-world/611374/
[https://perma.cc/KH5PKWZM].
25. See George D. Brown, McDonnell and the Criminalization of Politics, 5 VA. J. CRIM.
L. 1, 22 (2017) (“Professor Zephyr Teachout has been quoted to the effect that the
[McDonnell] decision ‘enshrine[s] bribery in our politics.’”(second alteration in original)
(quoting Dante Ramos, Opinion, Va. Ex-governor Wins at Supreme Court, but Corruption Is
Still
Illegal,
BOS. GLOBE
(June
28,
2016,
5:35
PM),
https://www.
bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/06/27/governor-wins-supreme-court-but-corruption-stillillegal/1UHYwo06otnV9wkXgU0gLJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/3P58-LPKT]).
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A. What Is Corruption?
When Benjamin Franklin accepted a diamond-encrusted snuffbox from
King Louis XVI of France, Americans understood the danger that the
luxurious gift posed to Franklin’s obligations to the United States.26 Even in
1785, the public feared that the king’s gift would corrupt Franklin, causing
him to favor the French king over his own country’s interests.27 The fear
resulted in the Emoluments Clause of the Constitution, which is still used
today to monitor foreign gifts to public officials.28
Corruption is a broad concept that can be characterized in several ways.29
Usually, it requires a violation of a rule in connection with personal or
political gain.30 It can be defined as individuals with unique access to
political power abusing that power and acting outside the range of behavior
that is typically acceptable.31 This conduct often involves altering political
outcomes due to the influence of wealth or gifts.32 Not necessarily a quid
pro quo arrangement, corruption at its core involves secret deals that
circumvent systems of political accountability.33 The only consistent factor
defining corruption seems to be the harm that comes to citizens who have
entrusted their well-being to elected officials.34
This Note does not seek to offer a single definition of corruption. It is a
concept that has escaped definition in the courts and legislatures for years.35
But no matter how it is defined, whether in the year 1785 or 2021, society
understands that corruption is harmful to the democratic process and should
be controlled.

26. See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 1–3 (2014). For a picture of the
diamond snuffbox, see Allen McDuffee, This Diamond Gift to Benjamin Franklin Is the
Reason Donald Trump Can’t Profit from the Presidency, TIMELINE (Sept. 22, 2017),
https://timeline.com/benjamin-franklin-emoluments-constitution-40339b04c159
[https://
perma.cc/CR83-8DZR].
27. See TEACHOUT, supra note 26, at 2–3.
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; TEACHOUT, supra note 26, at 27; see also Sharon
LaFraniere, Appeals Court Allows Emoluments Suit Against Trump to Proceed, N.Y. TIMES
(May 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/14/us/politics/trump-emoluments-clausefourth-circuit.html [https://perma.cc/RJ2D-6967].
29. See Alexander K. Wilson, Note, Different Quids for Different Quos: Why Congress
Should Amend Anti-corruption Standards to Differentiate Between Campaign Contributions
and Gratuities After McDonnell, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1033, 1033–35 (2019).
30. See Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1393 (2013).
31. See Jacob Eisler, McDonnell and Anti-corruption’s Last Stand, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1619, 1665 (2017).
32. See Samuel Issacharoff, Comment, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118,
122 (2010). Although Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), plays an important role
in the federal corruption saga, this Note does not address Citizens United or the First
Amendment implications of federal corruption laws. Instead, its scope is limited to statutory
interpretations and the rationale behind the Court’s more recent decisions regarding the honest
services statute.
33. See Issacharoff, supra note 32, at 122.
34. See Eisler, supra note 31, at 1666–67.
35. See infra Part I.B (discussing the failure of the Court and Congress to officially define
corruption).
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B. The History of Federal Corruption Law
Originally passed in 1872 to address the sale of counterfeit currency
through the mail,36 the mail fraud statute became one of the federal
government’s most used instruments for combatting corrupt officials.37
Congress amended the statute in 1901 to prohibit “any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises.”38 In the 1940s, various circuit
courts began to read the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” to include not
only money or property but also a deprivation of “intangible rights.”39
The “intangible rights doctrine” criminalized schemes that defrauded
public and private entities of “intangible rights,” such as a public official’s
loyalty and fiduciary services.40 By the 1980s, the intangible rights theory
had been accepted by all the courts of appeals in cases of public corruption
and schemes to defraud private parties.41
Corruption prosecutions encountered a significant roadblock in 1987 when
the Court severely limited the use of the mail fraud statute in McNally v.
United States.42 The Court declined to extend the mail fraud statute to apply
to a public official who accepted commissions for granting insurance
companies the rights to administer Kentucky’s state insurance plans.43 In the
1970s, Howard “Sunny” Hunt was chairman of the Kentucky Democratic
Party and had de facto control over where the commonwealth would purchase
its insurance policies.44 Hunt arranged a deal with the Wombwell Insurance
Company where, in exchange for the state’s business, Wombwell would
direct kickback commissions to companies of Hunt’s choice.45 In total, the
Wombwell Insurance Company funneled $200,000 to a company controlled
by Hunt and owned by petitioner Charles McNally.46
Federal prosecutors charged McNally and Hunt with mail fraud under 18
U.S.C. § 134147 based on the mailing of a commission check from one of the
36. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to
Watch over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 158 (1994).
37. See generally Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (pt. 1), 18 DUQ. L. REV.
771, 772–73 (1980).
38. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 399 (2010).
39. See generally Byung J. “BJay” Pak, Private Sector Honest Services Fraud
Prosecutions After Skilling v. United States, DEP’T JUST. J. FED. L. & PRAC., Oct. 2018, at 149;
see also Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941) (“No trustee has more
sacred duties than a public official and any scheme to obtain an advantage by corrupting such
an [sic] one must in the federal law be considered a scheme to defraud.”), overruled in part by
U.S. v . Cruz, 478 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973).
40. Peter M. Oxman, Note, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute After McNally v. United
States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987): The Remains of the Intangible Rights Doctrine and Its
Proposed Congressional Restoration, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 744 (1988).
41. See id. at 747–48.
42. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
43. Id. at 356, 361.
44. Id. at 352.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 353.
47. At the time of the ruling, U.S.C. § 1341 provided that:
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insurance companies to Wombwell.48 While fraudulent in nature, the Court
found that the petitioners did not commit mail fraud because their conduct
was not plainly within the statute.49
The Court reasoned that it should only assume a harsher reading of a
criminal statute when Congress has spoken in “clear and definite
language.”50 If the prosecutors had shown a deprivation of property rights
by dishonest methods or schemes, the Court would have been willing to apply
the mail fraud statute.51 However, it declined to interpret every statute “in a
manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous” because it was not for
federal officials to set “standards of disclosure and good government for local
and state officials.”52 Congress needed to specifically set out what the statute
criminalized for the Court to uphold the convictions.53
Congress did not take long to respond. In the following year, it enacted 18
U.S.C. § 1346, a statute designed to cover the “intangible right of honest
services” that the lower courts had relied on before McNally.54 Specifically,
the honest services statute defined the term “scheme or artifice to defraud”
to include “a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of
honest services.”55
The short but direct legislative history of § 1346 makes Congress’s intent
abundantly clear. Congress designed the amendment to “arm Federal
prosecutors with the jurisdictional and investigative tools they must have to
fight fraud and corruption—tools that effectively had been taken away by
McNally.”56 It sought to restore the authority of U.S. attorneys to go after
“vote-buyers, corrupt officials, and white-collar criminals.”57 Congress
intended to return the state of corruption law to the pre-McNally
interpretations of mail fraud statutes and the intangible rights theory.58
For over twenty years, federal prosecutors enthusiastically accepted these
congressional empowerments. Despite criticisms that § 1346 was vague and
an unconstitutional violation of federalist principles,59 circuit courts upheld
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice or attempting so to do, [uses the mails or causes them to be used], shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
McNally, 483 U.S. at 352 n.1.
48. Id. at 353.
49. Id. at 361.
50. Id. at 359–60.
51. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987).
52. McNally, 483 U.S. at 360.
53. Id.
54. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402 (2010).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
56. See 134 CONG. REC. 32,639 (1988) (statement of Sen. Mitchell McConnell).
57. Id.
58. See 134 CONG. REC. S17,360 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1998) (statement of Sen. Joseph
Biden) (“The intent is to reinstate all of the pre-McNally caselaw pertaining to the mail and
wire fraud statutes without change.”).
59. Alex Hortis, Note, Valuing Honest Services: The Common Law Evolution of Section
1346, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1099, 1102 (1999).
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the constitutionality of the statute and the use of an intangible rights theory.60
The circuit courts interpreted the scope of conduct covered by the honest
services statute to be extremely broad.61 Although most courts still required
the alleged conduct to directly deprive the public of some entitlement, the
government satisfied the honest services element once it established that a
public official had engaged in “a scheme formed with the intent to defraud”
the public of its right to “honest services.”62
In 2010, the Supreme Court once again considered the definition of honest
services, as revised under § 1346.63 And once again they interpreted the
statute to constrain the federal government’s ability to prosecute
corruption.64 In Skilling v. United States,65 the U.S. Department of Justice
uncovered an elaborate scheme by Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling to prop up the
energy company’s short-run stock prices by fraudulently overstating Enron’s
Federal prosecutors charged Skilling with
economic well-being.66
conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud, alleging that through his false
representation of Enron’s well-being to public investors, Skilling had sought
to “depriv[e] Enron and its shareholders of the intangible right of [his] honest
services.”67
Following the narrowing principles behind McNally, the Court reversed
Skilling’s jury conviction and ruled that the “honest services” of the statute
were aimed at those involving mail fraud, not fraudulent schemes in
general.68 Although the Court recognized that Congress had reacted swiftly
to amend the statute to override McNally, they agreed with Skilling’s
argument that Congress did not speak clearly.69 To avoid striking down a
congressional act as unconstitutionally vague, the Court chose to adopt its
own construction of the statute, which limited its application to bribery and
kickback schemes.70
60. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1169 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that when a “political official
uses his office for personal gain, he deprives his constituents of their right to have him perform
his official duties in their best interest”); United States v. Catalfo, 64 F.3d 1070, 1077 (7th
Cir. 1995) (holding that defrauding of the right to control risk of loss had substantial tangible
value).
61. See, e.g., Walker, 490 F.3d at 1297; United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir.
2006) (convicting a businessman for attempting to pay a legislator); United States v. Hasner,
340 F.3d 1261, 1271 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (upholding the conviction of a local
housing official who failed to disclose a conflict of interest); United States v. Rybicki, 354
F.3d 124, 142 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding the conviction of lawyers who paid an insurance
adjuster to process their clients’ claims); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 369 (6th Cir.
1997) (upholding the conviction of students who colluded with their professor to plagiarize).
62. Walker, 490 F.3d at 1297.
63. See generally Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
64. See generally id.
65. 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 369 (alteration in original) (quoting Joint Appendix at 318a, ¶ 87, Skilling, 560
U.S. 358 (No. 08-1394)).
68. See Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1572 (2020).
69. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 404.
70. See id. at 408.
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In 2016, the Court reinforced the narrow interpretation of Skilling by
vacating the conviction of former Virginia governor Robert McDonnell.71
Federal prosecutors charged McDonnell with meeting with the CEO of a
dietary supplement company to discuss using McDonnell’s office to
implement research studies at Virginia public universities in exchange for
gifts.72 These included: offers to fly on private planes while campaigning,73
an offer to buy an inauguration ball gown,74 a Rolex,75 the loaning of a
Ferrari,76 and other loans and gifts totaling over $150,000.77
McDonnell was charged with honest services fraud under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1343 and 1349.78 The theory underlying the charges was that McDonnell
had accepted bribes, so the parties agreed to define “honest services fraud”
with reference to the federal bribery statute.79 The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201,
makes it a crime for a public official to receive anything of value in return
for being “influenced in the performance of any official act.”80 Section 201
subsequently defines “official act” to mean “any decision or action on any
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy” taken in a official
capacity.81
In the unanimous opinion, Chief Justice Roberts explained that holding
meetings to consider a matter, such as undertaking a research study at a
public university, did not qualify as an “official act” under § 201.82 An
official act required the public official to “make a decision or take an action
on that ‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy,’ or agree to
do so.”83 Setting up a meeting to discuss holding an event, even with
someone who has supplied the official with luxury gifts, does not qualify as
such.84 Therefore, prosecutors improperly instructed the jury that the
meeting was an “official act” and the Court overturned the conviction.85
The McDonnell ruling significantly narrowed statutory interpretations of
anti-corruption efforts. The Court established that the question or
controversy had to be “more specific and focused than a broad policy
objective.”86 McDonnell’s conduct was undoubtedly “distasteful,” but the
“tawdry tales of Ferraris, Rolexes, and ball gowns” were not the Court’s

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
Id. at 2361–62.
Id. at 2362.
Id.
Id. at 2363.
Id.
See id. at 2362–64.
Id. at 2365.
Id.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)).
18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3).
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371.
Id. at 2372 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201).
Id.
Id. at 2375.
Id. at 2374.
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concern.87 Instead, the Court focused on limiting the boundaries of the
federal government’s use of the federal bribery statutes.88
The 2020 ruling in Kelly demonstrates that the Court remains committed
to those limitations. In the unanimous opinion, Justice Kagan explains that
while the evidence clearly showed “deception, corruption, [and] abuse of
power,” the federal laws did not cover closing lanes of traffic in political
retaliation.89 Section 1343 criminalizes “any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.”90 Federal prosecutors, therefore, had to prove
property fraud.91 Prior cases before the Court92 emphasized that the
government was not only required to show that Kelly and Baroni engaged in
deception but also that money or property was the object of their fraud.93
Since the retaliatory scheme provided neither actor with financial gain, their
conduct was not criminal under § 1343.94
C. Efforts by Congress
Congress has not completely taken a back seat as corrupt actors escape
justice. Following Skilling, both the U.S. House of Representatives and the
Senate considered bills that would have expanded federal corruption
jurisdiction.95 A 2012 House bill proposed to widen the definition of
“official act” to include public official duties and increase the maximum
sentence of imprisonment for breaking the law.96 In the same Congress, the
Senate introduced and passed the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge
or STOCK Act,97 which prohibited members of Congress from using
information and influence gained through their positions for personal benefit.
Although section 18 discusses “official acts,” the STOCK Act mostly
addressed public officials leveraging confidential information in the stock
market.98
Of course, neither of these congressional efforts prevented the Court from
reversing the conviction of Governor McDonnell, leaving a pothole for
Congress to fill. In 2018, Senator Elizabeth Warren introduced the Anti87. Id. at 2375.
88. Id.
89. See Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1568 (2020).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
91. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1568.
92. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–10 (2010); McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987).
93. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1571.
94. Id. at 1568–69.
95. See MICHAEL A. FOSTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45479, BRIBERY, KICKBACKS, AND
SELF-DEALING: AN OVERVIEW OF HONEST SERVICES FRAUD AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 23–24
(2020); Stop Trading On Congressional Knowledge Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); see also H.R. 2572, 112th Cong.
(2011).
96. H.R. 2572, §§ 5–8.
97. Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
98. See generally id.

2021]

BRIDGING THE GAP

2349

Corruption and Public Integrity Act in the Senate.99 The bill, which proposed
a variety of corruption regulations, restricted lobbyists’ ability to seek
“official action” from members of Congress and Congress’s ability to accept
gifts from lobbyists.100 Warren later acknowledged that she wanted to
expand the definition of “official act” to close the “tractor-sized loophole”
left by McDonnell.101 The bill ultimately died in a Republican-controlled
Senate.102
Although the bill failed to become law, politicians seemed to hear
Warren’s call for better anti-corruption laws. During the 2019 Democratic
presidential primary, several candidates, including South Bend, Indiana,
mayor Pete Buttigieg and Senator Amy Klobuchar, committed to passing
anti-corruption laws early in their prospective tenures.103 The House
followed up in 2019 with the For the People Act—a bill that sought to limit
big money in politics and to enact stricter ethics rules for federal officials.104
However, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell called the bill the
“Democrat Politician Protection Act” and it never passed the Senate.105
Shortly after Kelly, the Congressional Research Service published a report
about honest services fraud and the cases that define it.106 It concluded that
Congress should revisit the issue and consider the federalism and vagueness
concerns that had previously halted progress.107
D. State Corruption Laws
The Court’s limiting constructions have largely left public corruption
policing to the states.108 In Kelly, Justice Kagan noted that New Jersey has
its own official misconduct law, which prohibits the unauthorized use of
official functions.109 Many states have similar laws aimed at policing official

99. See S. 3357, 115th Cong. (2017).
100. See id. § 105(c)(1)(B), § 208 (prohibiting lobbyists from making gifts to legislative
officials).
101. Elizabeth Warren, My Plan to End Washington Corruption, MEDIUM (Sept. 16, 2019),
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/my-plan-to-end-washington-corruption-554c7f01aaa5
[https://perma.cc/4ERW-THQW].
102. See S. 3357—115th Congress: Anti-corruption and Public Integrity Act, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s3357 [https://perma.cc/3MWV-GQ3X] (last
visited Mar. 16, 2021).
103. See Alexander Burns, Seven 2020 Democrats Pledge to Focus First Bill on Fighting
Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/29
/us/politics/end-citizens-united-pledge.html [https://perma.cc/Z5K3-QEPA]. Unfortunately,
President Joe Biden was not one of these candidates.
104. See Catie Edmondson, House Democrats Will Vote on Sweeping Anti-corruption
Legislation.
Here’s What’s in It, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/03/07/us/politics/house-democrats-anti-corruption-bill.html
[https://perma.cc/CPP5-NDFQ]; see also H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019).
105. See Edmondson, supra note 104.
106. See generally FOSTER, supra note 95.
107. See id. at 24.
108. See Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1571 (2020) (“The upshot is that federal
fraud law leaves much public corruption to the States (or their electorates) to rectify.”).
109. See id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:30-2 (West 2021).
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misconduct and public corruption.110 These state laws make it illegal for
public actors to obtain a “benefit” through the misuse of their official
functions, setting a broader standard than the federal one.111
Courts have disagreed on whether federal honest service charges have to
be based on state law violations.112 Some courts have held that the honest
services statute requires that a state official breach a state law duty rather than
violate a federal definition of appropriate conduct.113 Other courts have
disagreed, holding that the states do not have exclusive control over the ethics
of official conduct.114 In the end, the Supreme Court declined to answer the
question, instead opting to define “honest services” as requiring bribery and
kickbacks.115
II. CROSSING TROUBLED WATERS: VAGUENESS, FEDERALISM, AND
CRIMINALIZING POLITICS
The unanimous decisions in McDonnell and Kelly have seemingly
cemented the notion that the Court will narrowly interpret statutes aimed at
political corruption. Principles of vagueness and federalism are often
advanced as the constitutional foundations behind these decisions. These
principles’ influence is traceable throughout the case law.116 In many ways,
these are two sides of the same coin: the principles advance constitutional
values limiting the federal government’s ability to prosecute crimes.
However, the use of vagueness and federalism in unison has also led to a
carveout for political actors that some have deemed “the critique of the
criminalization of politics.”117
Determining which side of the conceptual corruption bridge the Court
lands on with these concerns in Kelly is crucial to Congress’s ability to
combat corruption. This part will explore the arguments made on both sides
for these principles and examine how the courts applied those arguments in
the aforementioned federal corruption cases. Part II.A examines federalism
110. See, e.g. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-404 (2021) (defining first-degree official
misconduct as an “unauthorized exercise of [official’s] functions” with “intent to obtain a
benefit” for the official or maliciously harm another); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.00 (McKinney
2021) (prohibiting a public servant from obtaining a benefit through “an unauthorized exercise
of his official functions”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-402 (2021) (prohibiting “an
unauthorized exercise of official power” knowingly used to obtain a benefit or to harm
another); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.80.010 (2021). For a table listing official misconduct laws
and ethical violations for different states, see Ethics and Public Corruption Laws: Penalties,
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research
/ethics/50-state-chart-criminal-penalties-for-public-corr.aspx [https://perma.cc/T855-TB7N].
111. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.00 (prohibiting a public servant from obtaining a
benefit through “an unauthorized exercise of his official functions”).
112. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 403 n.36 (2010).
113. See United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1997).
114. See United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1244–45 (9th Cir. 2008), vacated,
561 U.S. 476 (2010).
115. See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 404.
116. See infra Part II (discussing the effect of the vagueness doctrine and federalism in
federal corruption cases).
117. See Brown, supra note 25, at 37.
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principles and how the Court has protected the states’ right to self-regulate.
Part II.B discusses the use of the vagueness doctrine in corruption cases,
including reliance on the rule of lenity and limitations on prosecutorial
discretion. Finally, Part II.C analyzes the “criminalization of politics”
concept and the claim that the Supreme Court is protecting corrupt political
activity from prosecution.
A. Federalism: Balancing Federal and State Powers
If you are wondering why corruption cases like Kelly and McDonnell are
brought under obscure mail and property fraud statutes, you are not alone.118
Often, they are the only authority that the federal government has to
prosecute corruption. The Constitution provides measures to limit corruption
in the federal government, but it does not directly regulate corruption at the
state level except through the grant of Congress’s enumerated powers.119
None of these powers specifically grant the federal government police
powers to address corruption by state officials.120 Congress must therefore
use what powers it does have to impose laws aimed at corruption. The postal
power,121 the commerce power,122 and the spending power123 have become
some of the main sources of authority for federal corruption laws.124
Federalism in this context refers to the constitutional balance of federal
and state power that guarantees and protects fundamental state liberties.125
There are strict limitations on the power of the federal government to
intervene in state and local affairs. This is particularly prevalent in criminal
law.126 Under the federal system, “[s]tates possess primary authority for
defining and enforcing the criminal law.”127 Attempts to broadly define
criminal statutes to include activity outside the delegated powers of Congress
are therefore likely to be interpreted narrowly.128
One of the main critiques of federal corruption prosecutions is that they
usurp the power of the states and treat them as subordinates.129 Critics argue
that the healthy balance of power promised by the federalist system is only
maintained if the general police powers rest with the states, where they are
118. See Zernike, supra note 1.
119. See Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal Prosecution of State and Local
Corruption, 92 KY. L.J. 75, 89 (2004).
120. See id.
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
122. Id. cl. 3.
123. Id. cl. 1.
124. See Brown, supra note 25, at 6.
125. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
126. See George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption?—Mail Fraud, State
Law and Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 225, 226–27 (1997).
127. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993).
128. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (“Section 922(q) is a criminal
statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise,
however broadly one might define those terms. . . . It cannot, therefore, be sustained.”
(footnote omitted)).
129. See Brown, supra note 25, at 7.
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constitutionally reposed.130 The increase in federal crimes, especially those
dealing with state affairs, upsets this constitutional balance.131
Arguments for the defendants in these cases commonly invoke these
federalist principles. In general, petitioners argue federalism demands
respect for the authority of states to govern their own officials.132 They claim
the Court should be cautious in interpreting any law in a way that promotes
a change in the federal-state balance, and should only do so when Congress
has made its intent explicitly clear.133 When federal law does not capture an
act, defendants argue that state laws and public perception are strong enough
deterrents to curb corrupt behavior.134 All states have their own criminal
corruption laws,135 many of which may be better equipped to handle state
corruption.136 Petitioners and their supporters argue that the states should be
responsible for dealing with their own officials.137
The government conversely argues that the federalism concerns are not
truly an issue in federal corruption cases.138 Federalism concerns can arise
when Congress fails to clearly state its intentions.139 As the Court in McNally
noted, if Congress wanted to reach corruption, it had to speak clearly.140 The
government has argued that Congress did so by enacting the honest services
statute in an intentional attempt to override McNally.141
Even supporters of defendants’ arguments acknowledge that a restriction
on the federal government’s ability to prosecute state actors might fail where
a state has no corruption regulations.142 But what about when a state has
corruption regulations but fails to use them? The result might be similar to
the Bridgegate scandal, where Christie-appointed prosecutors at the state and

130. See Susan A. Ehrlich, The Increasing Federalization of Crime, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 825,
837 (2000).
131. See id.
132. See Brief for the Petitioner at 22, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016)
(No. 15-474), 2016 WL 825553, at *22.
133. See id. at 23–24.
134. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 25, Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010)
(No. 08-1394), 2010 WL 636023, at *25.
135. See Brown, supra note 25, at 7–8.
136. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:30-2 (West 2021).
137. See Brief of Amici Curiae Virginia Law Professors in Support of the Petitioner at 1,
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474), 2016 WL 946987, at *1 [hereinafter Brief of
Virginia Law Professors] (“Principles of federalism dictate that federal charges rooted in
claims of bribery against state public officials must be weighed first with reference to
applicable state anti-corruption statutes . . . .”).
138. See Brief for the United States at 36, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474), 2016
WL 1358962, at *36.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 36–37 (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987)).
141. See id. at 37; see also 134 CONG. REC. S17,360–02 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988)
(statement of Sen. Joseph Biden).
142. See Brief of Virginia Law Professors, supra note 137, at 12–13.
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county levels declined to bring charges against Christie or his staff,143 despite
New Jersey’s anti-corruption law criminalizing their conduct.144
This presents an important critique of the federalism defense. There has
been a long-recognized unwillingness of state and local prosecutors to
commit their efforts to pursuing corruption charges that interest the federal
government.145 This reluctance may become even more problematic when
dealing with other government actors. In essence, friends do not prosecute
friends. State governments may refuse to bring charges against state actors,
especially those within the same political party.146 Take, for instance, the
federal conviction of Robert Sorich, a former member of Chicago’s city
government who was convicted under the honest services statute for granting
thousands of civil service jobs based on political patronage and nepotism.147
There is an obvious conflict of interest for a local prosecutor to pursue the
very officeholder that appointed that individual. Federal intervention may
therefore be necessary to protect the federal government’s strong interest in
promoting integrity at all levels of government.148 Ensuring that state and
local officials perform their duties in the interest of their constituents, and not
for personal benefit, is itself a fundamental federalist principle that the
Supreme Court should protect.149
The Court has held that these principles of federalism apply to vague
federal statutes.150 Of course, McNally set a strong precedent when the Court
143. In 2016, a New Jersey Superior Court judge signed a criminal summons against
Christie, ruling that there was probable cause to charge him with official misconduct. See
Aliyah Frumin, Judge Finds Probable Cause to Probe Chris Christie Over Bridgegate, NBC
NEWS (Oct. 13, 2016, 11:45 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/judge-findsprobable-cause-probe-chris-christie-over-bridgegate-n665766
[https://perma.cc/A4T7NXUA]. State Attorney General Christopher Porrino recused himself shortly before the
ruling. See Allison Pries, Judge Again Denies Request for Special Prosecutor in Christie Case,
N. JERSEY (Dec. 23, 2016, 7:37 PM), https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/2016
/12/23/judge-denies-motion-reconsider-rejection-special-prosecutor-christie-bridgegatecase/95793480/ [https://perma.cc/2BQP-V8F5]. The day after the ruling’s announcement,
Bergen County, New Jersey, prosecutor Gurbir Grewal, a Christie appointee, removed himself
from the case as well and the charges were not brought. Id.
144. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:30-2 (West 2021) (prohibiting the “unauthorized exercise
of official functions”).
145. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 369 (1983) (“Indeed, a recurring problem in this area (as
well as in the related area of bribery of the administrators of such funds) has been that state
and local prosecutors are often unwilling to commit their limited resources to pursue such
thefts, deeming the United States the principal party aggrieved.”).
146. See Richard Messick, Where the Real Blame for Letting Bridgegate Defendants off
Lies:
Part
I,
GLOBAL
ANTICORRUPTION
BLOG
(May
20,
2020),
https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2020/05/20/where-the-real-blame-for-lettingbridgegate-defendants-off-lies-part-i [https://perma.cc/8PH5-SDLV] (“State prosecutors may
be part of a tight-knit ruling elite and thus either profit directly from corruption or fear the
reproach of friends and colleagues if they were to ‘upset the apple cart’ by going after corrupt
members of the elite.”).
147. See United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008).
148. See Henning, supra note 119, at 102.
149. See Brief of the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondent at 10, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15474), 2016 WL 1388255, at *10.
150. See Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 859 (2014).
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held that it was not for the federal government to set “standards of disclosure
and good government for local and state officials.”151 Most subsequent
decisions heavily adhere to this guiding principle.
In McDonnell, the Court agreed with the defense that the government’s
position raised “significant federalism concerns.”152 It is a state’s right to
define its own sovereignty through the character of its officials.153 That right
includes the discretion to regulate how officials are allowed to interact with
constituents.154 Following the principle set forth in McNally, the Court in
McDonnell narrowly interpreted “official act” to protect the states’ rights to
set their own standards of government.155
B. Due Process and the Vagueness Doctrine
A large portion of federal corruption decisions rest on the vague language
used in fraud statutes. The vagueness doctrine commonly incorporates two
guiding principles to narrow criminal statutory language: fair notice and
limiting discriminatory prosecution.156
1. Fair Notice and the Rule of Lenity
The vagueness doctrine generally holds that a criminal statute must
sufficiently define the offense so that ordinary people can easily understand
what conduct is prohibited.157 Based on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, the doctrine focuses on requiring legislatures
to establish clear guidelines to govern law enforcement.158
Due process is often tied to fair notice. The fair notice standard requires
that a statute “provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is
prohibited.”159 When the average citizen does not know what is required
under the law, courts may strike down statutes.160 The vagueness doctrine,
therefore, guarantees that ordinary individuals can determine what acts are
illegal with reasonable certainty.161
The due process elements of the vagueness doctrine and, in particular the
fair notice requirement, are foundational to the Court’s well-established
151. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987).
152. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2373.
153. See id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)).
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. See id. (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).
157. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
158. See id. at 353–54, 358; see also Cristina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness:
Suggested Revisions to the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS
J. 255, 266 (2010) (“It is now the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and its
applications to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment that is the basis for the void for
vagueness doctrine.”).
159. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).
160. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (citing
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)); Karem v. Trump, 960 F.3d 656, 664
(D.C. Cir. 2020).
161. See Lockwood, supra note 158, at 271–72.
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commitment to the rule of lenity. When vagueness in a criminal statute
creates more than one rational interpretation, the rule states that the Court
should choose the option more favorable to the defendant.162 The Court uses
the rule of lenity to ensure fair notice by construing statutes to criminalize
only clearly covered conduct.163 Due process principles bar the Court from
applying interpretations of statutes that are not clearly within congressional
intent.164
Defendants’ arguments in corruption cases rely heavily on precedent.
They claim that the lack of clarity in the governing statutes leaves individuals
such as McDonnell or Skilling without fair notice that they could be
committing serious felonies.165 Defendants claim they were left guessing as
to what conduct the federal statute covered, creating significant due process
concerns in criminal proceedings.166 As McDonnell aptly argued, defendants
“should not need to consult Nostradamus to know what federal law
prohibits.”167
Ambiguity may also extend beyond the language of the statute itself. One
of the justifications for the government’s broad interpretation of the honest
services statute is that Congress’s quick statutory override of McNally shows
it intended to return the statute to its pre-McNally usage.168 But defendants
argue that simply referring to the state of the law pre-McNally is not enough,
since the pre-McNally case law was an assortment of vague decisions.169
They claim that the “jumble of disparate cases” construing the honest
services statute in that era often produced inconsistent and conflicting results,
leading to a variety of interpretations.170 The lack of a well-defined statute
combined with the ambiguity of the pre-McNally case law leaves the federal
corruption laws in a vague condition that provides no fair notice.171
Where vague language blurs the line between what is lawful and unlawful,
the rule of lenity may be invoked.172 Briefs favoring the defendants in these
cases argue that lower courts ignore this well-established canon of

162. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359–60 (1987); United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); United States v. Phifer, 909 F.3d 372, 383–84 (11th Cir. 2018).
163. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997).
164. See id.
165. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 132, at 60.
166. See id. at 20–21.
167. See id. at 60.
168. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
169. See Brief for Petitioner at 39, Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (No. 081394), 2009 WL 4818500, at *39.
170. See Amicus Curiae Brief of National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support
of Petitioner & Urging Reversal at 2, Skilling, 561 U.S. 358 (No. 08-1394), 2009 WL 5017531,
at *2 [hereinafter Brief of Criminal Defense Lawyers] (quoting United States v. Brown, 459
F.3d 509, 523 (5th Cir. 2006)).
171. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 169, at 42.
172. See Amicus Brief of Former Virginia Attorneys General in Support of Petitioner at 8,
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 08-1394), 2016 WL 878861, at *8.
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construction.173 Petitioners argue that the “jumble of cases” pre-McNally
and the interpretations of the statutes since then show Congress’s failure to
clearly define the conduct proscribed.174 This inconsistency leads to multiple
interpretations, the harsher of which “trap the innocent.”175 When this is the
case, petitioners argue the rule of lenity compels the Court to side with
defendants and reverse convictions.176
The Court in Skilling agreed with the defendant that the government’s
interpretation of the honest services statute implicated significant vagueness
issues.177 There was no doubt that Congress intended to reincorporate the
pre-McNally intangible rights theory of fraud.178 However, the Court ruled
that the pre-McNally theory was neither clear nor consistent.179 While preMcNally decisions regularly applied the fraud statute to bribery and kickback
schemes, there was almost no consistent application of the statute to
intangible rights.180 The Court reasoned that “Congress intended § 1346 to
reach at least bribes and kickbacks” but widening the scope any further
would raise due process concerns.181 Relying on pre-McNally applications
to define the statute provided inadequate fair notice.182 Since the statute itself
provides little guidance on the meaning outside the pre-McNally context, the
Court ruled that the government’s broad interpretation would have left the
statute impermissibly vague.183
The Court in McDonnell also agreed that the government’s interpretation
of the statute raised due process concerns.184 The Court recognized that
“official act” is not defined with proper definiteness.185 It ruled that the lack
of meaningful limits on “official act” allows the government to squeeze too
much conduct into the statute’s coverage, some of which is otherwise
lawful.186 Not only was the term vague but the definition prosecutors gave
the jury also failed to provide any qualifications that limited the statute’s
scope.187 The Court found that the government’s stance that all of

173. See Amici Curiae Brief of 77 Former State Attorneys General (Non-Virginia)
Supporting Petitioner Robert F. McDonnell at 11, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474),
2016 WL 909266, at *11 [hereinafter Brief of 77 Former State Attorneys General].
174. See Brief of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 170, at 4.
175. See Brief of Benjamin Todd Jealous, Delores L. McQuinn & Algie T. Howell as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474), 2016 WL
878851, at *5 [hereinafter Brief of Benjamin Todd Jealous et al.] (quoting Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).
176. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 169, at 48.
177. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 405 (2010).
178. See id. at 404.
179. See id. at 405.
180. See id.
181. Id. at 365, 408.
182. See id. 412–13.
183. See id.
184. See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016).
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 2373–74.
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McDonnell’s acts qualified as official action created the type of baseless
criminal prosecution that the Court has consistently rejected.188
While acknowledging the vagueness concerns, the Court in both Skilling
and McDonnell declined to strike down the honest services statute as
unconstitutionally vague.189 In each case, the Court determined its
interpretations of the statute avoided the constitutional vagueness concerns,
allowing the statute to function with sufficient definiteness.190 Even Justice
Thomas, who would have constitutionally invalidated the statute in
Skilling,191 joined the unanimous decision in McDonnell refusing to do so.192
By construing it narrowly rather than voiding the entire statute, the Court
allowed the honest services statute to remain in place with “ample room for
prosecuting corruption.”193
2. Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion
The vagueness doctrine also serves the important role of limiting
prosecutorial enforcement powers.194 Although fair notice is vital, the Court
has recognized that preventing the arbitrary enforcement of the law is more
important.195 It has ruled that overly vague statutes improperly give
prosecutors and judges the ability to enforce and resolve law based on their
own personal interpretations.196 It is the legislatures’ role, and not the courts’
or prosecutors’, to define criminality.197
The defendants and their supporters argue that §§ 1343 and 1346 are so
vague that they not only allow but encourage arbitrary enforcement.198 They
claim that there is a significant constitutional problem when the only thing
standing in the way of a felony indictment is the discretion of a federal
prosecutor.199 Defendants argue that even where the prosecutors use such
discretion wisely, the mere exercise of that discretion due to a vague statute
is unconstitutional all the same.200 They claim that Congress cannot allow
prosecutors and judges to dictate federal corruption law through intentionally
188. See id. at 2374.
189. See id. at 2375; Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 403–04 (2010).
190. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2375; see also Skilling, 561 U.S. at 404.
191. See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 415–16 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“A statute that is
unconstitutionally vague cannot be saved by a more precise indictment nor by judicial
construction that writes in specific criteria that its text does not contain.”(citations omitted)).
Justice Thomas joined Scalia in the concurrence. Id.
192. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2355.
193. See id. at 2375.
194. See Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal Statutes—Balancing
Acts, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 4 (1997).
195. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).
196. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972); see also Lawson, 461
U.S. at 357.
197. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
198. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 13, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474), 2016
WL 1496878, at *13; Brief of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 170, at 3.
199. See Brief of Former Federal Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474), 2016 WL 878849, at *5.
200. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 169, at 44.
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ambiguous statutes.201 If Congress wants to criminalize such conduct, it
must do directly and speak clearly; it cannot delegate legislating to the courts
and the discretion of prosecutors.202
The Court in McDonnell agreed that the limits of a criminal statute should
not be defined at the discretion of federal prosecutors.203 It could not allow
the broad interpretation to stand in hopes that the government would wield
excessive authority responsibly.204 The statute’s vagueness afforded
prosecutors the discretion to define “official act” in any way they chose, and
they chose to define it without any true bounds in violation of due process.205
Skilling also recognized the concerns about “arbitrary and discriminatory
prosecution” that often accompany a vague criminal statute.206 As with the
fair notice concerns, the Court opted to “construe” rather than “condemn”
Congress’s enactment.207 Using the newly minted interpretation of “honest
services” as including only bribes and kickbacks, the Court reasoned that
there was no true risk of arbitrary prosecution under the more confined
definition.208 Once again, the Court avoided invalidating the entire statute
by interpreting it in a way that maintained what the Court felt was Congress’s
intended target.
C. The Criminalization of Politics
Protections against vagueness and principles of federalism apply to all
criminal cases and a wide variety of other scenarios. However, when they
combine to intervene in political affairs, they can form a third line of defense
for political actors. Some scholars refer to this as “the critique of the
criminalization of politics.”209
The critique contends that vague statutes allow courts and prosecutors to
interpret laws, such as the mail fraud statute, in a way that “mak[es] everyday
politics criminal.”210 It is not just a minor interference in state affairs but the
federal government subordinating state officials. This creates ample room
for abuse, such as creating politically motivated traps for unwary
politicians211 or halting political interaction altogether.212
201. See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 198, at 3.
202. See id. at 3; see also Brief of Thomas Rybicki as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 4, Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (No. 08-1394), 2009 WL
4951297, at *4.
203. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372–73.
204. See id.
205. Id. at 2374.
206. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 412.
207. Id. at 403.
208. Id. at 412.
209. See Brown, supra note 25, at 37.
210. United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2015).
211. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 411 (1999).
212. See Blagojevich, 794 F.3d at 735 (“A political logroll, by contrast, is the swap of one
official act for another. . . . Governance would hardly be possible without these
accommodations, which allow each public official to achieve more of his principal objective
while surrendering something about which he cares less, but the other politician cares more
strongly.”).
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Critics argue that this interference can have serious negative implications
for government functions. Governing is not easy work, and there are
inevitable trade-offs that are necessary to public office.213 Dealmaking and
“back-scratching” have become essential components of American politics
and are often used rationally to get the ball rolling on legislation.214 If
anything, critics argue these practices may be evidence of a “healthy political
system, not a corrupt one.”215 Essentially, if everyone is doing it, how can it
be that bad?
Although corruption prosecutions are presumably aimed at creating a
better government, defendants argue they may do the exact opposite. Federal
corruption prosecutions make state and local officials more accountable to
the federal government than to those who voted for them.216 The mere threat
of federal prosecution and years in jail217 may scare off extensive interaction
and compromise.218 In this way, attempts to curb police corruption and
punish bad actors in the political system may have the ironic effect of
negatively impacting healthy government functioning.219
Critics of criminalizing politics argue that, until Congress speaks more
clearly on the issue, local political corruption should be left to the states in
which the political actors are directly involved.220 They assert that the broad
limits of federal corruption law have left “headline-grabbing prosecutors in
pursuit of local officials, state legislators, and corporate CEOs” with the
autonomy to interpret the law to cover whichever actions they desire.221 This
federal interference violates both due process and federalist principles,
forming a double violation that the courts should protect against.
Cases that accede to these arguments have been read as creating a
constitutional shield for political corruption, allowing abusers of power to
insulate themselves from federal prosecution using principles of vagueness
and federalism.222 Professor Zephyr Teachout has expressed concern that
the McDonnell decision effectively “enshrined bribery in our politics.”223

213. See JONATHAN RAUCH, BROOKINGS INST., POLITICAL REALISM: HOW HACKS,
MACHINES, BIG MONEY, AND BACK-ROOM DEALS CAN STRENGTHEN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
15
(2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/political-realismrauch2.pdf [perma.cc/AU6S-CFBF].
214. See id. at 7.
215. Id.; see also Blagojevich, 794 F.3d at 735 (“Governance would hardly be possible
without these accommodations . . . .”); Brown, supra note 25, at 12; see, e.g., Thomas B.
Edsall, Opinion, The Value of Political Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/opinion/thomas-edsall-the-value-of-politicalcorruption.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/EW6W-RAYS] (arguing that some
corruption reforms negatively impact the political process).
216. See Moohr, supra note 36, at 175.
217. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 666 (imposing up to ten years imprisonment).
218. See RAUCH, supra note 213, at 19.
219. See id.
220. See, e.g., United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 779 (7th Cir. 1976).
221. Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1204, 1206 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222. See Brown, supra note 25, at 14–15.
223. See Ramos, supra note 25.
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The language of the critique is prominent in the briefs supporting
McDonnell. Petitioners argue that vaguely defined corruption statutes pose
particularly “grave dangers” for political figures.224 The way the government
attempts to apply honest services statutes allows prosecutors to investigate
and indict any official they want.225 Petitioners claim that any political
dealing can be turned into a serious felony.226 The discretion would allow
prosecutors to target political adversaries, permanently changing the
American political landscape.227 Some supporters go so far as to compare
politicians to other historically targeted groups, such as civil rights leaders in
the 1960s.228
McDonnell and those in his corner claim that the “chilling effect” that this
threat would have on political participation could upend the government
process.229 Using § 1343 to criminalize routine political actions would cast
a shadow over political dealings and discourage beneficial interactions.230
Every meeting with another politician or lobbyist would have to be secondguessed for fear of committing a federal felony.231 Even if the Court
consistently overturns convictions, they argue the mere ability of prosecutors
to bring serious charges could completely derail the political logrolling
central to American democracy.232 Exercising political influence with
constituents is not explicitly criminalized by the law,233 and petitioners argue
that to stretch the honest services statutes to capture such conduct robs
constituents of their democratic right to support candidates who share their
beliefs.234
224. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioner at 11, McDonnell
v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474), 2016 WL 891338, at *11.
225. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 132, at 42.
226. See Brief of 77 Former State Attorneys General, supra note 173, at 2; see also Brief
for the Petitioner, supra note 132, at 41.
227. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Republican Governors Public Policy Committee in
Support of Petitioner at 15–16, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474), 2016 WL 891337,
at *15–16 [hereinafter Brief of Republican Governors].
228. See Brief of Benjamin Todd Jealous et al., supra note 175, at 2–11 (“At various times
in our history, legislatures have enacted deliberately vague criminal laws. Executive
authorities have deliberately employed such laws to target political dissidents, homosexuals,
African Americans, the civil rights movement, and other disfavored and marginalized
segments of society. The Court has repeatedly invalidated convictions under these laws as
violations of due process.”).
229. Brief of Amici Curiae Public Policy Advocates & Business Leaders in Support of
Petitioner at 3, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474), 2016 WL 891336, at *3; see also
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 132, at 40.
230. See Brief of 77 Former State Attorneys General, supra note 173, at 1 (“At the very
least, it empowers federal prosecutors to charge state officials with crimes for routine political
pleasantries, casting a fog over every dinner with a constituent or appearance at a fundraiser.”).
231. See id. at 18.
232. See id. at 1.
233. See id. at 9 (“[T]rading on the ‘network and influence that comes with political office’
is not against the law.” (quoting United States v. Urciuoli, 513 F.3d 290, 294, 296 (1st Cir.
2008))).
234. See Brief of Republican Governors, supra note 227, at 21–22 (“The facilitation of
access for political supporters ‘embod[ies] a central feature of democracy—that constituents
support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are elected can
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The McDonnell decision justifiably raises concerns that the Court would
protect corrupt political dealings. The language of the critique can be found
throughout the decision, much of it taken directly from the briefs. The Court
directly agreed with the petitioners that “breathtaking expansion of publiccorruption law would likely chill federal officials’ interactions with the
people they serve and thus damage their ability effectively to perform their
duties.”235 Representative government requires that public officials
communicate with their constituents and use their positions to tend to their
concerns.236 The Court expressed significant concern that the government’s
interpretation of the statute would damage the ability of officials to perform
these duties.237
According to the Court, McDonnell was a case about interpreting the
meaning of “official act” as part of a vague statute.238 However, in
interpreting the statute, the Court echoed the concerns of McDonnell and his
supporters that “typical” political dealings should not fall within the
interpretation, at least not without Congress’s express indication.239 The
Court applied a narrow reading of “official act” that enforced what it
conceived as meaningful limits on its interpretation by the government.240 It
found that a “cause, suit, proceeding or controversy” involved only “formal
exercises of governmental power.”241 The Court ruled that the entire statute
captured formal proceedings, such as lawsuits, congressional trials, and
legislative votes, but not “typical” meetings that a public official regularly
encounters.242 Doing so avoided the “absurdities” of convicting public
officials for holding meetings or speaking with constituents.243
Although the Court acknowledged that McDonnell’s actions were far from
typical constituent interaction, it nonetheless feared that upholding the
government’s interpretation would allow prosecutors to reach beyond
exchanges of high-value gifts and into normal political conduct.244 The
Court was concerned that the government simply could not be trusted to
prosecute responsibly when armed with such a vague statute.245
The Court considered vagueness- and federalism-related concerns, but it
analyzed their constitutional implications separately from the political
considerations.246 It appears the Court is using the doctrines as constitutional
be expected to be responsive to those concerns.’”) (quoting McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S.
185, 192 (2014))).
235. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016) (quoting Brief for Former
Federal Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, supra note 199).
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. Id. at 2368.
239. Id.
240. See id. at 2373.
241. Id. at 2374.
242. See id. at 2368–69.
243. See id. at 2370 (quoting United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398,
408 (1999)).
244. See id. at 2372–73.
245. See id.
246. See id.
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support beams for the political criminalization argument, attaching the
statutory interpretations to foundational constitutional theorems that are more
well established.247 Under this view, the Court seems to create the
implication that it is not just applying these constitutional standards but
creating a third line of defense for public officials.
III. ANOTHER ROADBLOCK IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS?: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF KELLY
Prior federal corruption cases have developed strong precedents with
regard to federalism, vagueness, and the criminalization of politics. Mainly,
the Court has established that it will protect the states’ sovereign right to selfregulate, will not allow prosecutors to expand their jurisdiction based on
vague statutes, and may be hesitant to criminalize what it considers to be
routine political behavior. The question becomes where Kelly lands on each
issue. Although Kelly reflects many of the concerns of McDonnell and
Skilling, in the end, the opinion seems to stop short of condoning the corrupt
behavior.
Part III seeks to determine where the Court currently stands on federal
corruption in the wake of Kelly. Part III.A analyzes Kelly using the same
principles as the other cases: vagueness, federalism, and the criminalization
of politics. It discusses how the decision handles each of these principles in
turn and compares them to McDonnell and Skilling to outline trends in the
law. Part III.B then applies those trends to propose amendments to the
federal law that would capture corruption while addressing the Court’s true
concerns.
A. Application to Kelly
Part III.A.1 applies the federalism principles used in other federal
corruption cases to Kelly. Part III.A.2 follows by analyzing the case under
the vagueness doctrine. Finally, Part III.A.3 examines the criminalization of
politics argument in Kelly.
1. Federalism
In Kelly, the abuse of the Port Authority and its interstate facilities
presented a unique federalism issue for the Court. The mail and wire fraud
statutes used to prosecute Kelly and Baroni were enacted pursuant to
Congress’s interstate commerce powers.248 Therefore, their conduct needed
to involve interstate commerce for the statute to be validly applied. In Kelly,
the use of the Port Authority, an interstate agency created by Congress,249 to
interfere with a bridge crossing from one state to another seemed to implicate

247. See id.
248. See supra Part I.
249. See United States v. Baroni, 909 F.3d 550, 569 (3d Cir. 2018), rev’d and remanded
sub nom. Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020).
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interstate commerce. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that the Third
Circuit rejected the federalism concerns presented by Kelly and Baroni.250
Despite arguments from Kelly that this rejection was ill founded,251 the
Supreme Court did not address the federalism issue in Kelly.252 Such silence
implies that the Court felt that charging Kelly and Baroni under the statute
was an appropriate exercise of federal power. When interstate commerce is
so blatantly involved, using the mail and wire fraud statutes is possible.
That is not to say that Kelly did not present other federalism issues. Like
in McDonnell, the Kelly Court expressed concerns over the federal
government interfering with a state’s sovereignty.253 Kelly and Baroni
exercised a regulatory power, part of a state’s “traditional police powers.”254
One of the driving forces behind the Court’s narrowed definition of property
was the often-cited McNally principle: “Federal prosecutors may not use
property fraud statutes to ‘set[] standards of disclosure and good government
for local and state officials.’”255 The Court reasoned that if it allowed
“property fraud” to reach Kelly’s conduct, then it would be permitting a
broad expansion of the federal criminal law into matters that are reserved for
the states.256 This reasoning seemingly extended the McDonnell ruling that
states have the sovereign right to define for themselves how and when
officials may exercise governmental powers.257
The states’ prerogative to regulate themselves seems to be a principle that
the Court upholds in federal corruption matters. Of course, there are subtle
differences in the federalism concerns. McDonnell deals with a state’s ability
to control its own actors, while Kelly is more focused on states’ exercise of
police powers.258 However, both decisions are rooted in the federalism
principle that the states must be free to regulate themselves and their
officials.259 The Court made clear in each case that the federal government
does not have the authority to leave the outer boundaries of its criminal
statutes ambiguous to create a broad expanse of federal jurisdiction over state
actors.260
Professor George Brown argues that Kelly invites a rethinking of the role
federalism plays in the anti-corruption saga.261 He concludes that Kelly

250. Id. at 575.
251. See Brief for Petitioner at 17, Kelly, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (No. 18-1059), 2019 WL
4568203, at *17.
252. See generally Kelly, 140 S. Ct. 1565.
253. Id. at 1572.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1574 (alteration in original) (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350,
360 (1987)).
256. Id.
257. See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text.
258. Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1572–73.
259. See id. at 1574 (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987));
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016).
260. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1574; McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2373.
261. See George D. Brown, Defending Bridgegate, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 141,
176–77 (2020).
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implies that federal prosecutors should no longer play the lead role that they
currently do in the corruption model.262 Although it is admittedly difficult
to envision how this might work, Brown acknowledges there are plenty of
opportunities to narrow the role of the federal government.263
While the Court clearly promotes a more narrow role for the federal
government, it is not clear that it is calling for the erasure of federal
prosecutors as the lead in corruption prosecutions. It certainly poses the
question for legislatures that McNally and its predecessors have consistently
reinforced: how can the federal government regulate the standards of state
actors without setting those standards?264 Nevertheless, immediately ruling
out the ability of federal prosecutors to bring corruption charges would
unnecessarily limit the options available to a Congress attempting to solve an
already restricted issue. More importantly, federal intervention may be
crucial in cases involving state and local actors where local authorities may
otherwise not act.265 Kelly focuses on the federal government interfering
with state regulatory powers but stops short of saying that federal prosecutors
should refrain from pursuing corruption charges. This distinction may be
critical to future drafts of the law, and it is one of the reasons why Kelly, as
even Brown notes, could be celebrated rather than chalked up to a win for
corruption.266
2. Vagueness
Despite being raised in charges under a different statute, the vagueness
components of Kelly appear very similar to those raised in McDonnell and
Skilling. In particular, the Court’s narrowing of “property” is analogous to
the “official act” interpretation in McDonnell.267 The Kelly “property”
definition also relies on the Skilling principle requiring actual transfer of
something of monetary value rather than violations of intangible rights.268
Although the decision does not directly reference the vagueness doctrine,
vagueness principles can be found throughout. In Kelly, the Court found that
the government’s definition of “property” would impermissibly expand the
reach of federal prosecutors.269 Interpreting the normal meaning of the
words, Kelly and Baroni did not “commandeer” state “property” in their
scheme270 any more than McDonnell undertook an “official act” by holding
a meeting.271 To prevent overreaching prosecutors from criminalizing
conduct that is not clearly within the statute, the Court applied a very narrow

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See id. at 176.
See id.
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
See Messick, supra note 146; supra note 146 and accompanying text.
See Brown, supra note 261, at 177.
See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1574 (2020).
Id. at 1573.
See supra notes 242–43 and accompanying text.
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interpretation of “property,” directly addressing the vagueness doctrine’s
prosecutorial discretion protections.272
In Skilling, the Court already decided that “intangible rights” were not
within the core scope of the mail and wire fraud statutes.273 In establishing
the bribery and kickback requirement, the Court made it clear: the law
dictates that to prosecute based on corrupt acts, an offical must have received
tangible benefits.274
Kelly holds to this principle. In Kelly, the Court drew a firm line between
“property” and what it deemed to be an exercise of regulatory power.275
Section 1341 requires the object of the fraud to be actual property in the
hands of the victim, not the state’s exercise of its police powers.276 The Court
ruled that Kelly and Baroni exercising the state prerogative to realign traffic
lanes did not involve such tangible property.277 They did not pick up the
lanes and take them or convert them for personal use.278 They undoubtedly
exercised their authority for malicious reasons, but all they did was “alter a
regulatory decision,” not take property.279 Just as the Court in Skilling found
that undisclosed self-dealing did not qualify as a bribe or a kickback and
therefore was outside the scope of § 1346,280 Kelly found that “property” in
§ 1343 simply did not include the use of regulatory power.281
The Kelly Court did not limit its narrow interpretation to solely the word
“property.” It doubled down and made it as clear as possible that in no way
could what Kelly and Baroni did be interpreted as taking the state’s
property.282 The Court held that under § 1343, property must not only play
a role in the fraud—it must be the “object of the fraud.”283 It reasoned that
the “object” of Kelly and Baroni’s fraud was not to take the Port Authority’s
property—in this case, the wages of Port Authority employees—but to carry
out their scheme.284 They did not care about Port Authority labor or seek to
obtain its services.285 Labor costs were merely a byproduct of their lies, not
a sufficient basis on which to uphold the convictions.286
The Kelly opinion’s devotion to clarifying the language of the statute
reflects the most consistent trend in federal corruption cases. The vagueness

272. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1574.
273. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 368 (2010).
274. See id. at 407–08; see also supra note 181 and accompanying text.
275. Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1572 (citing Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 23 (2000)).
276. See Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 23–26 (2000); see also United States v.
Weigand, No. 20-CR-188, 2020 WL 5105481, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2020).
277. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1572.
278. See id. at 1573.
279. Id.
280. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 411 (2010).
281. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1572.
282. See id. at 1574 (“Because the scheme here did not aim to obtain money or property,
Baroni and Kelly could not have violated the federal-program fraud or wire fraud laws.”).
283. Id. at 1573 (quoting Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 355 (2005)).
284. Id. at 1574.
285. Id. at 1573.
286. Id.
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argument is at the foundation of McNally, Skilling, and McDonnell.287
Although the Court does not explicitly cite the vagueness doctrine, its
influence nonetheless appears in Kelly. The Court will not allow federal
prosecutors to stretch the meaning of federal statutes to reach conduct that
Congress did not clearly intend.288 When forced to decide between two
interpretations, such as whether holding a meeting is an official act or not or
if closing lanes is taking property, it will err on the side of lenity and employ
a narrow construction of the statutes.289
What is not present in Kelly may be just as important as what is. Like in
Skilling and McDonnell, the Court did not strike down the statute as
unconstitutionally vague.290 In Kelly, the Court utilized statutory elements
rather than constitutional ones to confine the boundaries of the statute.291 It
presents some hope for prosecutors in future proceedings. The mail and wire
fraud statutes are independently constitutional; their language just does not
capture the conduct that the federal government wants them to in these
instances.
If provided with a statute properly tailored to the specific conduct, it is
more than possible that the Court would uphold federal corruption
convictions. The Kelly decision seems carefully written not to overextend
the application of the holding. For example, with reference to § 1343, Justice
Kagan emphasized that a “state or local official’s fraudulent schemes violate
that law only when, again, they are ‘for obtaining money or property.’”292
The Court agreed that what Kelly and Baroni did should not be protected but
ruled that their conduct did not specifically violate the federal program fraud
or wire fraud laws.293 The government had to prove property fraud, and it
failed to do so.294 Kelly, therefore, reads less as a constitutional bar to federal
prosecutions and more as a plea for congressional action.
Prosecutors’ hands nonetheless appear to be tied until Congress changes
the federal corruption laws in this respect. The government can continue
trying to wiggle around the narrow standards set in Skilling and reinforced
through McDonnell and Kelly,295 but the Court has now established a strong
precedent that it will take the narrow road and crack down on those attempts.
287. Supra Part II.B.
288. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 407–09 (2010) (citing McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987)).
289. See supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 275–81 and accompanying text.
292. Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1572 (2020) (emphasis added) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 1343).
293. Id. at 1574.
294. See id. at 1571.
295. See Brief for Amici Curiae Lord Conrad Black & Former Governor Robert F.
McDonnell in Support of Petitioner at 7, Kelly, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (No. 18-1059), 2019 WL
1275301, at *7 [hereinafter Brief of Lord Conrad Black] (“[T]he Government aims to ‘take[]
the jurisprudence full-circle’—not by refighting old interpretive battles, but by pushing a new
theory of liability that, if accepted, would render the critical limitations in McNally, Skilling,
and McDonnell meaningless.” (citation omitted) (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at
13, Kelly, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (No. 18-1059))).
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3. Criminalization of Politics
Just as in McDonnell, the criminalization argument is present in the Kelly
briefs.296 Robert McDonnell himself submitted a brief in support of Kelly
and Baroni,297 and the petitioner’s brief even uses the “chilling” language
from the McDonnell decision in one of its argument headings.298 The Court
therefore once again faced an opportunity to condone the corrupt behavior
on constitutional grounds.
Despite such opportunity, Kelly seems to tread on the perimeter of the
criminalization argument without actually committing to the constitutional
shield that McDonnell appeared to implement. The Court is indeed
concerned with the federal government criminalizing state actions that are
well within the traditional powers of the state.299 It recognized that
governance involves many regulatory choices and allowing the federal
government to criminalize all lies would undercut the previously established
standards of the Court.300 This sounds strikingly similar to the criminalizingeveryday-politics arguments made, and seemingly endorsed, in
McDonnell.301
However, Kelly turned on the statutory boundaries of “property.”302 What
conduct the federal government could constitutionally prosecute did not fuel
the decision. The Court was mostly worried about property statutes being
used to prosecute state actions that fell outside the statutes’ reasonable
interpretations.303
This represents a significant departure from McDonnell. Some read the
McDonnell decision as the Court normalizing the corrupt actions of officials

296. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 251, at 17 (“There is no end to the (bipartisan)
mischief that such a regime would facilitate, or to the chilling effect it would carry.”); Id. at
20 (“It would be more than a little surprising . . . if the judiciary found in the . . . mail fraud
statute[] a rule making everyday politics criminal.”(quoting United States v. Blagojevich, 794
F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2015))); Brief of the National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9, Kelly, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (No. 18-1059), 2019 WL
4729854, at *9 (“Here, the government’s theory of liability would politicize the mail fraud
statute beyond repair, making every political decision that involved deception on the public
vulnerable to criminal prosecution because in some collateral sense it was accompanied by a
government expenditure.”).
297. See generally Brief of Lord Conrad Black, supra note 295.
298. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 251, at 19 (including the header: “The
Government’s Theory Criminalizes Politics and Chills Public Service”); see also McDonnell
v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016).
299. Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1572.
300. See id. at 1574.
301. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372–73.
302. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1574 (“Because the scheme here did not aim to obtain money
or property, Baroni and Kelly could not have violated the federal-program fraud or wire fraud
laws. We therefore reverse the judgment.”).
303. See id. (“Federal prosecutors may not use property fraud statutes to ‘set[] standards
of disclosure and good government for local and state officials.’” (alteration in original)
(emphasis added) (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987))).
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by using political discourse to support its narrow interpretations.304 In the
course of interpreting “official act,” McDonnell weaves the criminalization
critiques into the constitutional arguments.305 The McDonnell Court is not
only focused on the expansion of federal jurisdiction reaching the decisions
of state officials.306 It is also concerned about the chilling effect such
convictions would have on the general political atmosphere.307 In other
words, the Court is not just worried about an overreaching criminal statute;
it is also worried that the reach will stop public officials from politicking.
While McDonnell’s political actions were not “normal,” the McDonnell
Court was hesitant to potentially criminalize any form of political activity.308
Kelly is not nearly as enthusiastic about protecting the everyday behavior
of politicians. It confines its analysis to what property fraud statutes can and
cannot do.309 Federal attorneys were not restricted from prosecuting corrupt
state officials because it would chill political behavior but because it is not
what property fraud statutes are for.310 According to the Court, those statutes
bar schemes aimed at obtaining property, nothing more and nothing less.311
The distinction here is key to understanding where the Court now stands
on federal corruption. As Justice Kagan notes, what Kelly and Baroni did
was an abuse of power, but “not every corrupt act by state or local officials
is a federal crime.”312 The Court has made abundantly clear that corrupt acts
will not constitute a federal crime under property fraud statutes. Kelly does
not imply that all politics are off-limits to federal prosecutors. They just need
something more direct than wire fraud laws.313
B. Building the Bridge: How Congress Can Get over the Federal
Corruption Issue
This section analyzes the impact that the Kelly decision will have on
federal policymaking and how Congress can amend the law to conform with
the Court’s decisions. Part III.B.1 summarizes how Kelly dealt with each
concept above to determine a direction for the Court moving forward. Part
III.B.2 then proposes that Congress amend the honest services statute to
define honest services violations with reference to state corruption laws.

304. See Zephyr Teachout (@ZephyrTeachout), TWITTER (May 7, 2020, 1:03 PM),
https://twitter.com/ZephyrTeachout/status/1258442288562405376 [https://perma.cc/BSV7E2F3]; supra Part II.C.
305. See supra notes 238–43 and accompanying text.
306. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372.
307. See id. (“In addition to being inconsistent with both text and precedent . . . .”).
308. Id.
309. See Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1574 (2020) (“The property fraud statutes
do not countenance that outcome.”).
310. See id.
311. See id.
312. Id.
313. See id.
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1. The Court’s Expectations for Corruption Law After Kelly
Kelly does not represent a victory for U.S. anti-corruption regulation. The
Court overturned the corruption convictions and in the process, removed
another viable federal prosecution tool. However, the rationale behind the
decision may have paved a path forward to enact more comprehensive anticorruption legislation.
As in previous cases, the Kelly Court once again ruled that Congress must
provide clear legislation that shows that federal statutes are intended to reach
specific conduct, such as that at issue in Kelly.314 Federal prosecutors have
attempted to prosecute corruption under the mail fraud statute in a variety of
ways, but the Court has consistently rejected those arguments under
vagueness and federalism principles.315 Prosecutors can continue to
experiment with interpretations of property fraud316 or bribery statutes317 but,
given their lack of success, legislative action is a more practical solution.
There is already a congressional appetite to draft legislation that deals with
federal corruption.318 Amending the honest services statute to incorporate
the Court’s rulings in Kelly, McDonnell, and Skilling would be a viable
legislative solution.319 However, Congress will have to carefully tailor any
legislation to meet the standards the Court established in these recent cases.
To start, Congress needs to adhere to the Court’s vagueness concerns by
narrowing the scope of the honest services statute. Congress has never
defined “honest services,”320 leaving the Court to develop its own definition
using the bribery and kickback requirements.321 The Court’s reluctance to
strike down the statute as unconstitutionally vague shows that it does not
want to invalidate the statute, but it will require meaningful boundaries for
“honest services” to satisfy vagueness requirements.322 A congressional
enactment will need to properly limit the statute’s scope to sufficiently define
“honest services” and prevent prosecutorial overreach.
There are also definite federalism concerns to be addressed. The Kelly
decision furthers the Court’s protection of states’ ability to self-regulate.323
However, this does not completely prevent congressional intervention. Kelly
does not represent a total bar for federal prosecutors to bring charges against
corrupt state actors. To succeed, prosecutors will need a congressional
enactment that not only defines the boundaries of the law but also respects
the federal-state balance and the ability of states to maintain their regulatory
powers.
314. See id.
315. See supra Parts I.A, II.
316. See generally Kelly, 140 S. Ct. 1565.
317. See generally McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
318. See supra Part I.C.
319. See FOSTER, supra note 95, at 23–24.
320. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (using but not defining “honest services”).
321. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 189–93 and accompanying text.
323. See supra text accompanying note 257; see also supra notes 152–55 and
accompanying text.
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While the Kelly Court did focus on federalism and vagueness concerns, it
did not focus on the “criminalization of politics” and neither should
Congress. Kelly showed that the Court is not necessarily concerned with
criminalizing political conduct so long as the criminalization adheres to wellestablished vagueness and federalism principles. If a statute clearly defines
corrupt conduct and allows the states to maintain their ability to self-regulate,
the Court is unlikely to extend protections to corrupt political actions. If
Congress narrows the scope of the honest services statute to comport with
the federalism and vagueness principles, the Court will likely allow
corruption convictions under the statute to stand.
2. The Bridge Less Traveled: Defining Honest Services with Reference to
State Law
The key to improving the honest services statute will be defining “honest
services” with clarity to narrow its scope while still maintaining the
regulatory sovereignty of the states. Congress should consider an
amendment that both allows states to set their own standards for officials and
simultaneously grants the federal government the ability to enforce those
standards.
Most states not only have corruption laws but have very well-written and
specific ones.324 Recall New Jersey’s official misconduct law, which
prohibits the “unauthorized exercise of . . . official functions.”325 If state
prosecutors brought the charges against Kelly and Baroni under this statute,
the Court implied that their conduct likely would have fallen within its
scope.326 However, state officials did not bring the charges, highlighting the
concern that local officials are unlikely to prosecute their peers.327 Because
it was a state law, the federal government was unable to bring the charges,
leaving a gap in the law that Kelly and Baroni were fortunate enough to fall
into.
Congress should bridge this gap by drafting an amendment allowing the
federal law to define “honest services” with reference to state law. Defining
federal law with reference to state violations is not a new concept, even
within federal corruption law. A McNally footnote explains that the honest
services statute is self-contained and therefore relies only on itself to define
its content.328 The Court then provides an example of a federal statute that,
relying on the interstate commerce power, references state law to criminalize
interstate gambling and prostitution.329 The footnote details that § 1952(b)
of the Travel Act330 defines the broad term “unlawful activity” with reference
324. See supra Part I.D.
325. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:30-2 (West 2021); see also supra note 109 and
accompanying text.
326. See Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1571 (2020).
327. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
328. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 377 n.10 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
329. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b).
330. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951–1952.
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to state law.331 The statute defines “unlawful activity” to include, among
other things, extortion, bribery, and arson in violation of the law of the state
where the conduct occurred.332
Although the Travel Act defines “unlawful activity” using state statutes,
the Court has still granted federal prosecutors some discretion as to how to
apply the law. For example, the state statute only needs to cover a generic
definition of the alleged conduct. In United States v. Nardello,333 the Court
found that a state blackmail law could be used in a federal extortion
indictment because the blackmail statute included “a type of activity
generally known as extortionate.”334 The Court determined that when an act
prohibited by state law falls within a generic definition of extortion, it
constitutes an “unlawful act” under the Travel Act.335 The Court reiterated
that the Nardello decision leaves little uncertainty about the Travel Act’s
meaning and therefore dismissed federalism and rule of lenity concerns in
Perrin v. United States.336 The Travel Act represented Congress’s deliberate
intent to change the federal-state balance to enforce both state violations and
federal bribery law in one swoop.337 Until the Travel Act impeded a
constitutional provision, the Court would leave its construction to
Congress.338
Of course, the scope of the Travel Act is not unlimited. Not every unlawful
activity qualifies as “unlawful activity” under the Act; it is only those
activities specifically provided in the statute involving liquor, narcotics,
controlled substances, gambling, prostitution, arson, bribery, or extortion.339
The statute merely allows the government to use the state definitions of these
individual crimes. Further, the conduct must still fit within a generic
definition of the crime. For example, in Scheidler v. National Organization
for Women, Inc.,340 the Court reversed a conviction under the Travel Act
because the conduct did not fit within the common definition of extortion.341
The defendants did not obtain or attempt to obtain property and therefore did
not commit extortion.342 The Travel Act also requires that mail or interstate
facilities actually be used to promote the unlawful activity, limiting its effect
on intrastate governance.343
331. McNally, 483 U.S. at 377 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
332. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b).
333. 393 U.S. 286 (1969).
334. Id. at 296.
335. See Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409–10 (2003).
336. 444 U.S. 37 (1979); see also id. at 49 n.13; White Collar Crime: Fourth Survey of
Law, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1987) (“Perrin thus dismissed the argument expressed
in Rewis that federalism concerns require a narrow interpretation of the Travel Act.”).
337. See Perrin, 444 U.S. at 50.
338. See id.
339. See White Collar Crime: Fourth Survey of Law, supra note 336, at 737.
340. 537 U.S. 393 (2003).
341. See id. at 393.
342. See id. at 410.
343. See 3 JOEL ANDROPHY, WHITE COLLAR CRIME § 17:6 (2d ed. 2020); see also Andrew
Wiktor, Note, You Say Intrastate, I Say Interstate: Why We Should Call the Whole Thing Off,
87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1323, 1357 (2018).
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Despite the limitations, the Travel Act still provides federal prosecutors
with the necessary flexibility to police acts that toe the line with respect to
the delicate federal-state balance. Congress should take a similar approach
with the honest services statute. Lower courts have considered in the past
whether or not the definition of “honest services” must comply with state
laws.344 A congressional enactment answering the question in the
affirmative would be a natural progression in the development of the law.
Following the structure of the Travel Act, Congress should amend § 1346
to include another provision defining “honest services,” similar to the way
the Travel Act defines “unlawful activity.”345 The amendment would utilize
state official misconduct laws to define honest services in a way that reaches
political corruption.346 Such a provision might read:
As used in this section “honest services” means extortion, bribery, or
official misconduct in violation of the laws of the state in which committed
or of the United States.

Adding such a provision would be an effective cure to the ailments that have
plagued federal corruption prosecutions. To deal with vagueness concerns,
the amendment would constitute a clear action by Congress, defining the
conduct it intends to proscribe. Instead of leaving “honest services” open to
the interpretation of federal prosecutors, this amendment would properly
limit the scope of honest services by limiting it to bribery, extortion, or state
official misconduct violations.
The defining provision also clarifies the covered conduct by comporting
with current understandings of the law. The Court already uses bribery and
kickbacks as the defining parameters of “honest services.”347 Drafting the
amendment to include bribery and extortion credits the Court’s previous
rulings, rather than overriding them.348 By adding rather than replacing,
Congress would make its intentions clear: it intends to make both bribery
and the abuse of official regulatory powers illegal. As with the Travel Act,
the use of clear language to show what Congress intends will likely prevent
successful challenges to the statute based on the rule of lenity and the
vagueness doctrine.349 If Congress wants to criminalize corrupt actions, it
needs to speak clearly, and this amendment would do just that. It would
properly limit the statute’s scope to sufficiently define the criminal conduct
and prevent prosecutorial overreach.
The amendment also addresses federalism concerns. Defining “honest
services” with reference to state law prevents federal prosecutors from setting
standards of good governance for states by using the standards states set

344. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text.
345. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b).
346. See supra Part I.D.
347. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
348. Compare McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987), with 18 U.S.C. § 1346;
see also supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
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themselves.350 The law would grant federal prosecutors the ability to target
corruption but preserve the states’ ability to determine what qualifies as
“official misconduct” and what does not. States would thus retain the power
to control what conduct their officials may be held liable for. If the law were
to follow the same path as the Travel Act, the reservation of state regulatory
power and the clear congressional intent of the amendment should extinguish
the federalism and rule of lenity concerns.
As with any proposal, there are drawbacks to this amendment. For one,
defining “honest services” using “official misconduct” may be trading one
vague term for another. Some state courts have debated how “official
misconduct” is defined within statutes.351 The main question that arises is
what qualifies as the public official’s “duty” and what types of actions
amount to “official misconduct.”352 Despite the Court’s flexibility in
applying “generic” definitions of extortion and bribery to the Travel Act,
these terms have relatively well-understood meanings tied to property or
monetary gain. Perhaps this is why the Court chose to define “honest
services” using bribery.353 An “official misconduct” definition may
therefore raise the same vagueness issues as “honest services.”
However, even though there are vagueness concerns with “official
misconduct,” the term is still not as vague as “honest services” and should
not be enough to condemn the proposed amendment. While courts have
struggled to define “honest services,”354 they have successfully defined
“official misconduct” using statutes, codes of conduct, and other welldefined regulations.355 Unlike the possibly boundless scope of “honest
services,” courts have dismissed charges under “official misconduct” that fail
to establish that a set of rules prohibit the official’s actions.356 “Official
misconduct” therefore offers enough guidance to provide the meaningful
limits to the law that “honest services” has failed to produce.
CONCLUSION
Kelly is not a win for anti-corruption efforts, but it does represent a
potential guidepost to lead future attempts to police corrupt public officials.
350. McNally, 483 U.S. at 360.
351. See generally Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Prosecuting Judges for
Ethical Violations: Are Criminal Sanctions Constitutional and Prudent, or Do They
Constitute a Threat to Judicial Independence?, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 727 (2006); Thomas
Cerabino, Recent Development, Penal Law § 195.00(2), 54 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 137 (1979).
352. Compare Wright v. Beard, No. 14CV-90, 2014 WL 12769265, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Oct.
24, 2014) (holding that it is not clear what statute, rule, or law amounts to a violation of official
misconduct), with People v. Garson, 848 N.E.2d 1264, 1265 (N.Y. 2006) (ruling that official
misconduct for a judge may be defined using the New York Code of Judicial Conduct).
353. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
354. See supra Part I.B.
355. See, e.g., State v. Tolotti, No. A-5380-17T4, 2019 WL 692300, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Feb. 20, 2019) (upholding an official misconduct conviction based on a violation
of the regulations of the official’s local police department).
356. See, e.g., State v. Kueny, 986 A.2d 703, 711 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010)
(overturning an official misconduct conviction).
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The Supreme Court’s decision applies reasoning consistent with previous
cases focused on vagueness and federalism concerns but stops short of
normalizing the misconduct. The decision provides Congress with the
necessary structure to enact new federal corruption laws that reach the
conduct in Kelly and previous cases without upsetting well-established
constitutional principles.
One option would be to amend § 1346 to define “honest services” using
state laws. This would create a balance between the need to define the
prohibited conduct and the right of the states to self-regulate. Despite its
possible limitations, the amendment would be a simple way for Congress to
provide federal prosecutors a viable statute to combat corruption while
accounting for the Supreme Court’s concerns. Given the history of the
Court’s interpretations, such an amendment is the best option to solve the
ongoing corruption issue. Kelly shows that it will take Congress “speaking
clearly” on corruption to successfully prosecute corrupt acts at the federal
level. Congress should take the hint and enact an amendment to the honest
services statute.
Citizens understand that political corruption at all levels has negative
implications for society. The public has a natural expectation that when it
elects officials, those official will serve the public’s interest and not their
own. When corrupt conduct such as occurred in the Bridgegate scandal goes
unpunished, it undermines the foundations of American democracy and
permanently leaves marks of distrust on the government. The United States
needs to solve the federal corruption issue that has been evolving in the courts
for over forty years in a way that fits within democratic principles. The Court
has created the roadmap to do so through decisions like Kelly. It is now up
to Congress to build the bridge and finally close the gap between public
expectations and federal corruption prosecutions.

